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Abstract: As guest editor of this special issue of Esercizi Filosofici, the author introduces
Kenneth R. Westphal’s and Paolo Parrini’s position papers on pragmatism, idealism and
realism by elucidating the background and rationale of the workshop she organized on 29
April, 2015 at the Department of Humanities of the University of Trieste, within the frame-
work of her undergraduate course in «History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy».
The Appendix lists questions posed by students and by the audience, to which the invited
speakers replied in discussion following the presentations; their respective replies follow
their main papers.
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1. Background
The workshop, «A Real Dialogue on an Ideal Topic», with Kenneth R.
Westphal1 and Paolo Parrini2 on idealism, realism and pragmatism took
1  Kenneth Westphal has held (full) professorships in philosophy in England (Norwich,
Canterbury), visiting professorships at Northwestern University and at the Martin Luther
Universität Halle (a.d.Salle), and research fellowships in Heidelberg, Bielefeld (twice) and
Göttingen. He has now settled in Istanbul as Professor of Philosophy at Boðaziçi Üniversi-
tesi. The main focus of his research is on the character and scope of rational justification in
non-formal domains, including both morals (ethics & theory of justice) and theoretical
philosophy (epistemology, history & philosophy of science). In response to the Pyrrhonian
Dilemma of the Criterion, and drawing upon Kant, Hegel, classical American Pragmatism
and analytic epistemology, he has been developing a pragmatic, social and historical account
of rational justification which provides sufficient ground for realism about the objects of
human knowledge, and strict objectivity about basic moral norms: independent of debates
about ‹moral realism› and motivation. His books include Hegel’s Epistemological Realism
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place on April 29, 2015, partially sponsored by the Department of Hu-
manities of the University of Trieste. It was conceived and organized
within the framework of my 2014–15 undergraduate course in «History
of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy», entitled: Idealism, Realism
and Pragmatism: Historical Aspects of a Contemporary Philosophical
Problem. Students were involved in preparing for the workshop: A read-
ing group3 worked on additional material provided by the two invited
speakers, which the group presented to the class, and they prepared a set
of questions for discussion at the workshop.
At the methodological level, one main aim of this course was to avoid
the pitfalls of the stereotypical historian devoted to the close, antiquarian
study of past ideas, the prevailing analytical trend to dismiss meticulous
and supposedly sterile attention to philosophy’s history and the theoreti-
cal distortions of instrumentalizing texts of the past for present purposes.
(1989), Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism (2004), and How Hume and Kant Recon-
struct Natural Law (2016). He edited the collected later papers of Frederick L. Will, Prag-
matism & Realism (1997), and recently Realism, Science and Pragmatism. He has published
over a hundred research articles.
2 Paolo Parrini served as full professor of theoretical philosophy at the University of
Florence until 2010–11. He anticipated his retirement to devote himself to research. He is
founding member and president of the Italian Society of Analytical Philosophy, founding
member and member of the Board of the Italian Society of Theoretical Philosophy, and
member of the Board of the Florence Centre of History and Philosophy of Science. During
his academic career he was continuously and closely involved with doctoral training pro-
grammes in Philosophy, not only locally but nationally. His research addresses the major
fields of theoretical philosophy: epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, and hermeneutics,
with special focus on the issues of realism, truth and rationality. His books include: Knowl-
edge and Reality (Conoscenza e realtà, 1995; Engl. tr. 1998) and Il valore della verità
(2011). He is currently working on a book on «Epistemology and Ontology», addressing the
issue of realism from the standpoint of the subject-object relationship. An international
speaker in the field, he has published nearly 200 research works, including translations into
other European and extra-European languages. His international prominence is also indicated
by his editing Kant and Contemporary Epistemology (1994) and co-editing Logical Empiri-
cism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (2003).
3 I gladly mention the participants: Gabriele Buzzai, Belén Colom (an Erasmus student
from Argentina), Nicola Freschi, Tobias Kompatscher, Federico Passavanti and Giacomo
Pirani.
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A decade ago this set of issues was already prominent within Anglophone
scholarship: in his Introduction to a collection of Descartes’ sources for
the Meditations, John Cottingham wrote: «the practice of ‹up-to-date›
analytic philosophy risks becoming obsessive and shortsighted unless it
is informed by a lively awareness of the philosophical tradition that deli-
vered us where we are today».4 More recently, this year Robert Pippin
published a book aiming to show the bearing of the practice of the his-
tory of philosophy on philosophy itself.5
Embedding this spirit in the scope of my course, my first purpose was
to show how great issues of the past remain pertinent to current philo-
sophical debate, and how thematically focussed instruction in history of
philosophy develops students’ abilities to discern and define the basic
parameters of these issues and to recognize the interplay between persis-
tence and changes in philosophical problems across the ages. To foster
students’ reflective and sensitive analysis, assessment, conclusions and
decisions, they must develop these skills and abilities by confronting
competing considerations bearing on the philosophical issues, to consider
arguments for and against proposed solutions, to evaluate the grounds of
philosophical approaches and claims – both present and past – and to
identify which challenges these must meet:6 in short, to mature their ca-
pacity to judge through an historical-philosophical education which I
regard as indispensable when majoring in philosophy.7
4 Ariew, Cottingham and Sorell (1998: xiii).
5 Pippin (2015). According to the editorial presentation: «Robert B. Pippin offers the
thought-provoking argument that the study of historical figures is not only an interpretation
and explication of their views, but can be understood as a form of philosophy itself. In doing
so, he reconceives philosophical scholarship as a kind of network of philosophical
interanimations, one in which major positions in the history of philosophy, when they are
themselves properly understood within their own historical context, form philosophy’s lingua
franca. Examining a number of philosophers to explore the nature of this interanimation, he
presents an illuminating assortment of especially thoughtful examples of historical commen-
tary that powerfully enact philosophy» (available on line at: http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/
books/book/chicago/I/bo20299044.html). 
6 See the roundtable discussion on these issues in Schneewind, et al., (2004: 361–388). 
7 See on the point Westphal (2012a), (2012b).
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Now history of philosophy is not merely preparatory to something
else, that is, to how philosophical problems and questions, taken in ab-
straction from their historical context and instances, should be articulat-
ed, presented, defined and practised; historical philosophy is itself a ra-
tional and critical enterprise. For example, if anti-Cartesianism has be-
come a prominent issue today in epistemology, philosophy of language,
phenomenology, ontology, philosophy of mind and philosophical psy-
chology,8 to identify Cartesian or Anti-Cartesian features of contempo-
rary views requires understanding both Descartes and the Cartesian tradi-
tions flowing from his work.9
This concern does not simply reflect a traditional Italian historical
approach to philosophical studies. Today, the critical dimension of the
history of philosophy is internationally acknowledged also in research
works which reflect an Anglophone philosophical orientation and exam-
ine the fundamental standpoints and terms of reference of philosophical
enquiry from late modernity to contemporary reflection. For instance, in
his introduction to a collection of essays examining the ‹transcendental
turn› in philosophy from Kant to Husserl, Heidegger and Merlau-Ponty,
Sebastian Gardner (2015: 1) insists on taking together the historical and
systematic aspects, arguing that: «In so far as historical interest has a cri-
tical dimension, it will constantly broach systematic issues, just as any
convincing account of the nature of transcendental philosophy will need
to take account of the historical development». Pippin’s Interanimations
(2015) argues that no strict separation between the domains of history of
philosophy and philosophy is defensible; reviewers of his book highlight
that it shows us how «philosophizing historically is very much a future-
oriented enterprise, addressing the foundational philosophical concerns
8 As Amy Schmitter (2010: 497) writes: «Descartes is a figure who looms large in many
different spheres both inside and outside of philosophy, and in considering how to weight the
reception of his work, we cannot avoid intersecting with several such spheres».
9 This was the subject of my 2013–14 course and is the topic of my forthcoming book:
Cartesio contemporaneo. L'invenzione della disembodied mind negli studi anglo-americani:
un mito cognitivista? 
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of our culture».10 In a similar vein, the recent historical turn in philoso-
phy of science focusses either on the historical dimension of the evolu-
tion of science or on the problems, solutions and motivations of earlier
projects in the philosophy of science, examining how the historical fig-
ures engaged in these projects understood them. As Paolo Parrini (2007:
142) remarks: «First, this historical approach is of pivotal importance in
reaching a correct interpretation of the philosophies of the past. Second,
this approach must interact suitably with theory both in order to give
good historical results and to contribute to the evaluation and develop-
ment of the problems under consideration».
Consequently, the course culminated in the class preparations for the
workshop, by forming a study group to formulate in advance significant
questions for the invited speakers, which address distinctive features of
their positions against the backdrop of the historical material that stu-
dents studied in this course. Albert Einstein observed: «The value of an
education in a liberal arts college is not the learning of many facts, but
the training of the mind to think something that cannot be learned from
textbooks».11 I would rather prefer to speak, more modestly, of training
the mind to think of something by studying textbooks which cannot be
learned ‹from› textbooks.
The specific aim of this course was to address a serious challenge
arising from the contingent place of the course within the undergraduate
10 Reviewing Pippin’s book, R. Lanier Anderson remarks: «Pippin has long been a
leading voice in the history of philosophy. With Interanimations, he brings his readership
right into the process of philosophizing historically. The book brings together eleven chap-
ters that engage with other important readers of some of his touchstone historical philoso-
phers (notably Hegel, Nietzsche, Kant). It thereby advances debates with prominent thinkers
like McDowell, Brandom, Nehamas, Williams, Heidegger, and MacIntyre. But its real stakes
are still larger: Pippin’s book aims to show us what it is to advance philosophy through
engaging the great minds of the past—and through an ongoing conversation and argument
with others doing the same. From this point of view, philosophizing historically is very much
a future-oriented enterprise, addressing the foundational philosophical concerns of our
culture» (available on line at: http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/I/bo20299
044.html).
11 Einstein’s statement is quoted from A. Calaprice (2011: 100). 
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programme. In our Department of Humanities, the course in «History of
Modern and Contemporary Philosophy» is to serve both students who
shall continue studying within philosophical disciplines and also students
who will graduate in historical disciplines. Therefore as a professional
historian of philosophy, my main pedagogical challenge is to provide
both a service course interesting and useful to students who will not pur-
sue additional courses in philosophy, and yet at the same time to serve
students majoring in philosophy by initiating them into current philo-
sophical practices by studying historical philosophy. This dual challenge
is certainly demanding, though also intriguing.
To meet this challenge, I sought to connect the expected study of
some number of canonical texts and authors to what now occurs in con-
temporary culture and society, within which students live every day, and
which demands and requires elucidation and reflexion. Put otherwise, I
usually design my syllabus to address thinking, intellectually maturing
young people in a «post-postmodern» society, one largely based on sci-
entific rationality and its various applications, where culture has unveiled
our human production and ‹construction› of so many apparent ‹facts› of
nature by post-structuralist analysis, post-colonial discourse, coining of
new philosophical categories and various works in ethics, politics and
phenomenology. As Westphal (2014: 1) remarks: «Realism about partic-
ular objects and about their features or relations became problematic in
Twentieth Century philosophy when it became generally recognized that
we cannot, as it were, set aside our concepts, theories, beliefs, or, in gen-
eral, our language to inspect the fact themselves and on that basis assess
our beliefs, statements, or theories about them». In particular, in prepar-
ing the syllabus for this 2014–15 course, I anticipated my future mixed
group of young people exposed (by media and news) to the debate which,
say, associates (permissive) multiculturalism with relativism and con-
fronts problems of rational justification. Today, our young people are
also exposed to forms of fundamentalism as faith in ‹absolute› truths
which are threatening the European historical achievement of the idea of
non-confessional, universal human rights based upon values such as com-
mon humanity, the free exercise of reason and gender equality, all of
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which complicates issues about the rationality (or irrationality) of be-
liefs.12 Against this background, Locke’s (1689) Letters on Toleration
are as urgently important today as ever, and to inquire, say, à la Locke,
into the grounds and degrees of our opinions, persuasions and assent, to
account for the ways by which our understanding can set down any mea-
sures of the certainty of our knowledge, to evaluate different notions of
truth (either necessary or sufficient), to face the sceptical dilemma of the
criterion, to rework à la Kant the meaning of realism and idealism, mak-
ing sense of both scientific and moral experience, can acquire the signifi-
cance of examining very basic issues within philosophy while reflecting
on contemporary issues from the agent’s perspective – namely the stu-
dents’ perspective – who may fully discover, appreciate and exercise her
or his cognitive and rational capacities only through her or his «practice-
laden being-in-the-world». This perspective is nothing but the practical
starting point that makes pragmatism «a most significant framework for
contemporary discussions of rationality, knowledge, morality and val-
ues» (Pihlström 2011: 6).
2. Rationale
Accordingly, this course focussed on the set of key words which charac-
terize a central contemporary philosophical debate about overcoming the
apparent opposition between idealism and pragmatism, without abandon-
ing realism. The outlook of Pragmatism (with its origins in Peirce and
James and antecedents in Reid) can be summarized in the following
‹pragmatic maxim› of Peirce (1931: 5.412): «a conception, that is, the
rational purport of a word, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing
12 As to the «perennial epistemic problem of the rationality (or irrationality) of religious
belief», see Pihlström (2013b: 27): «This epistemic problem arises from the – real or appar-
ent – conflicts between science and religion, or reason and faith, in particular. Here pragma-
tism can offer us a very interesting middle ground. As William James argued, in Pragmatism
(1907) and elsewhere, pragmatism is often a middle path option for those who do not want to
give up either their scientific worldview or their possible religious sensibilities». On Pihl-
ström’s pragmatist philosophy of religion, see also Pihlström (2013a).
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upon the conduct of life». In this way, pragmatism aims to challenge the
empty metaphysical abstractions «of a philosophy that has no relation to
our activities within the world» and their practical consequences. One
classic issue about realism is whether, «in addition to the physical objects
and events we perceive, are there also non-physical, and hence non-per-
ceptible forms or ideas of kinds or characteristics, variously instantiated
in physical particulars, but which exist independently both of their in-
stances and of what we may happen to say, think, believe or know about
them?» (Westphal 2014: 1). By contrast, generally speaking, idealism has
been described as the claim that reality cannot be explained only by mat-
ter and motive forces, for it is also essentially constituted by ideas or
mental structures and active spiritual principles.13 The history of philoso-
phy shows a long tradition of ‹idealisms›: beginning with Parmenides and
Plato, then passing through modern times with Descartes, Leibniz and
Berkeley, ending up with Kant’s transcendental idealism and Hegel’s
absolute idealism. However, a line of ancient thought also offers relativ-
ism with Protagoras and the Skeptics, whereas the development of mod-
ern thought is crossed by Galileo’s metaphysical and epistemological
realism as well as by Locke’s and Newton’s empirical realism and
13 The Leverhulme Trust currently sponsors an international project entitled «Idealism
and Pragmatism: Convergence or Contestation?» Its network includes the Universities of
Pittsburgh, Sheffield, Cambridge, Sydney and Frankfurt, together with Columbia University,
Vanderbilt University and the Collège de France. The aim of the project is described as
follows: «a retrospective assessment of both the possible interactions between the two philo-
sophical traditions of Idealism and Pragmatism and their potential towards the production of
future original thought in philosophy». According to its rationale, «As such, pragmatism
offers a distinctive account of meaning, knowledge and metaphysics, which is opposed to the
abstractions of a philosophy that has no relation to our activities within the world. Laid out
as such, it may seem that idealism and pragmatism have little to do with one another and
could indeed be seen as intellectual opponents; [...] So, it may appear on the one hand to
pragmatists, that the idealist represents just the kind of empty and abstract metaphysical
theorizing that they want to overturn, while to idealists on the other hand, the pragmatist may
be viewed as offering a position that cannot resolve the problems that concern them, in
refusing to engage with such problems properly by offering instead a crude appeal to ‹practi-
cal consequences›. It could be assumed, then, that these two traditions will simply confront
each other as philosophical opposites» (http://idealismandpragmatism.org/project).
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generalizations. Another approach claims to combine truth with neces-
sity, to oppose demonstration and rigorous universality to a notion of
truth attained with sufficiency, proportionality, probability.
It became apparent that instructing students about significant selec-
tions from many ancient and modern authors provided good comprehen-
sion of questions central to current philosophical debate, such as those
presented by Westphal in the Introduction to his recent collection, Real-
ism, Science and Pragmatism (2014). Central to my course are these
questions: Does realism contrast to idealism when it holds that material
objects exist and have mind-independent characteristics? Is perception
direct awareness of external objects? Is scientific knowledge about
theory-independent phenomena and unobservable entities possible? The
course focused on these specific topics: 1) American Pragmatism: the
agenda of its founding fathers; 2) truth, real being and its manifestation
to subjects in the Atomists’ fragments; 3) description of phenomenal re-
ality by ancient Skeptics and the dilemma of the criterion of truth; 4) per-
ception and unification of sense-data in Platonic idealism; 5) the nature
of Galileo’s ontological and epistemological realism; 6) the quest for an
absolute foundation of science in Descartes; 7) primary and secondary
qualities, nominal and real essences in Locke; 8) immaterialism and
sense reality in Berkeley; 9) Hume’s skepticism about reason, and its re-
lations to ancient and modern philosophy; 10) Berkeley’s idealism re-
garded from the standpoint of Kantian transcendental idealism. The idea
to organize a workshop on idealism, pragmatism and realism was con-
ceived against this background.
An interesting coincidence is that the July 2015 London conference of
the above-mentioned Leverhulme Trust project includes the following
presentations14: David MacArthur (University of Sydney): «Pragmatism
and Skepticism»; Robert Pippin (University of Chicago): «Pragmatist
Themes in German Idealism»; Ulrich Schlösser (University of Tübin-
gen): «On Some Differences Between American Pragmatism and Ideal-
14 See: http: //www.hegelpd.it/hegel/london-idealism-and-pragmatism-convergence-or-
contes tation-conference/
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ism: Peirce and Hegel on Meaning, Confirmation and Reality»; Claudine
Tiercelin (Collège de France): «Why Pragmatism Implies Realism»; and
Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh): «From German Idealism to
American Pragmatism – and Back».
In Italy, media attention was cast on Maurizio Ferraris’s 2012 book
Manifesto del nuovo realismo; this revival of interest in the Realismus-
frage was further supported by Umberto Eco’s critical remarks «Il realis-
mo minimo». A conference on the topic was organized and the meeting
was held in May 2012 in Bologna «Quale realismo? Postmoderno e
nuovo realismo nel dibattito contemporaneo» (invited speakers: Paolo
Parrini, Maurizio Ferraris, Umberto Eco and Patrizia Violi). This meet-
ing occasioned Paolo Parrini’s reply to both Ferraris and Eco, and his
reassessment of realism, reality and sensible experience in his 2012 es-
say, «Realismi a prescindere».15 This upsurge of interest paved the way
to welcome reception of such very recent publications as Il pragmatismo
dalle origini agli sviluppi contemporanei,16 which focusses on American
classical pragmatism (Emerson Peirce, James, Royce, Mead, Morris,
Lewis), the diffusion of Pragmatism in Europe, and its relations to ana-
lytical philosophy (Quine, Sellars, Davidson), to critical theory (Apel,
Habermas, Honneth) and to naturalism (Sydney Hook and Morton
White); and considers specific contemporary versions of pragmatism de-
veloped by Rescher, Bernstein, McDermott, and Margolis, who follow
the classical tradition, and concludes with neo-pragmatism (Putnam, Ror-
ty) and the latest trends in the field (West, Brandom, Shusterman,
Haack). In this way also Italian scholars and university students can now
rely on a work similar to the Continuum Companion to Pragmatism
(2011), edited by Sami Pihlström.17
The speakers invited to our workshop are two distinguished guests.
Kenneth Westphal has developed a pragmatic account of rational justifi-
cation which identifies and justifies universally valid basic moral norms
15 This work was required reading in my course.
16 Calcaterra, Maddalena and Marchetti (2015).
17 Parts of this (2011) Companion were read and discussed in my course.
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and shows how a sophisticated social and historical account of empirical
knowledge justifies realism about the objects of commonsense and also
of scientific knowledge. As the foreign guest of the workshop he was in-
vited to speak first and he presented a paper entitled «Some Observations
on Realism, Science and Pragmatism». Paolo Parrini is an expert in phi-
losophy of science and analytical philosophy of language and epistemol-
ogy, who has written extensively on realism and anti-realism. To quote
Westphal, Parrini «is one of the few genuine experts both on Kant’s epis-
temology and on philosophy of science – especially Carnap and Quine –
and more generally on analytical semantics». Parrini presented a paper,
«Empirical Realism without Transcendental Idealism: Comment on Ken-
neth R. Westphal», which identifies points of agreement and disagree-
ment with Westphal’s position.
Our proceedings are arranged in two sections: Presentations and Dis-
cussion. Since Parrini’s paper offered also some comments on West-
phal’s approach, the discussion began with Westphal’s reply to Parrini’s
remarks, followed by questions from the floor to both invited speakers.
The following Appendix lists the issues raised by the students, myself
and members of the audience. The Discussion Section contains two pa-
pers: Ken Westphal’s «Some Replies to Remarks and Queries by Profes-
sor Parrini, Students and Members of the Audience» and Paolo Parrini’s
«Some Replies to Questions Posed by Students». Both speakers elected
to answer questions in a thematic order, and indicate the number of each
question answered in the Appendix.18
To conclude, Ken and Paolo indeed proved to be, beyond expectation,
the ideal characters to engage in genuine dialogue on the topic «idealism,
realism and pragmatism», by focussing on truth and rationality, the justifi-
cation of knowledge and the criticism of both metaphysical realism and
radical relativism, against the background of Kantian Critical idealism. I
wish to thank them both once again for their availability and generosity.
18 In using author-date references to their own or to each other’s papers or replies, they
use the same designations: ‹Westphal (2015a)› or ‹Parrini (2015a)› for the main papers;
‹Westphal (2015b)› or ‹Parrini (2015b)› for the replies.
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APPENDIX: Questions posed by Students
and by the Audience
To Kenneth Westphal:
Q1. One main point of your presentation is to reconstruct the key con-
cepts of American pragmatism against the background of the distinction
between semantic internalism and externalism and their respective links
with versions of nonrealism (antirealism, relativism, constructivism) and
reference to objects or events in one’s physical or social environment.
Would you please clarify how do you pass from this assessment to the
recovering of the Kantian roots of pragmatism and in which way your
inquiry significantly differs from from Sami Pihlström’s approach we
examined in our class? (Cinzia Ferrini)
Q2. How and in which regards the picture of pragmatism (which emerges
from reconnecting it with Kantian transcendental idealism and empirical
realism) may change when we consider the possibility of an Hegelian
legacy? (Cinzia Ferrini)
Q3. You argue that neo-pragmatism is committed to irrealism by its
meta-linguistic accounts of meaning and reference, whereas pragmatism
is committed to realism by its semantic externalism and its use of
Carnapian explication. What, then, do you make of Brandom’s neo-prag-
matism, which now claims to account for modal realism about subjunc-
tive, causal conditional truths regarding the objects of first-order dis-
course, whether commonsense or scientific? (Paolo Labinaz)
To Paolo Parrini:
Q4. We would like to know whether there are significant similarities be-
tween your «positive philosophy» and Peirce’s pragmatic and regulative
characterization of truth in terms of the indefinitely long run convergence
of the scientific community’s opinion towards a dynamic (evolutionary)
14
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reality that constrains inquiry? (Students)
Q5. Would you please clarify the respective functions of science and phi-
losophy in your view as well as their mutual links? More specifically, in
respect to the working scientists, should the philosopher reflecting on
science subordinate the philosophical analysis to specific problems, or in
your view there is a legitimate space for the autonomy of conceptual, ap-
parently ‹useless› questions? (Students)
Q6. In our class we learnt that according to ancient Scepticism and to
Hume that is a «question of fact» whether the perceptions of the senses
are produced by external objects that resemble them. However, according
to Hume, here experience must be entirely silent, because the mind can’t
possibly experience the connection of perceptions with objects. It seems
therefore that no «compelling» conflict between an extra-mental reality
and our cognitive claims can overcome scepticism via sensible experi-
ence. The question is, how can your positive philosophy, distrusting ‹the
transcendental› and relying on sensible experience address this Pyrrho-
nian/Humean representationalist, and indirect realist challenge? (Student:
Nicola Freschi)
To both speakers:
Q7. According to you, what difference does the pragmatic maxim make
to philosophy? (Students)
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